May a doctor treat a patient, despite that patient's refusal, when in his professional opinion treatment is necessary? This is the dilemma which must from time to time confront most physicians. An examination of the validity of such a refusal is provided by the present authors who use the case history of a patient refusing treatment, for cancer as well as for a fractured hip, to evaluate the grounds for intervention in such circumstances. In such a situation the patient is said to have a 'false belief' and it is the doctor's duty to try to change that belief in the patient's interest. The false belief is considered here in terms of the liberty principle, the patient's mental competence and on what is called the 'harm principle ' (harmn to other individuals or to society). Finally the concept of paternalism is examined. The authors conclude that the doctor must attempt to change a false belief, and if this fails he must examine the patient's mental competence to make the decision to refuse treatment. But in the last analysis the doctor may be under an obligation to respect the patient's refusal.
Readers might like to look at (or read again) the papers on 'Liberty' and 'Conscience' published in this Journal under the heading Analysis.
In recent years there has been substantial discussion of the conditions under which a consent to medical treatment or a refusal of medical treatment should be considered valid. Commentators 1 have stressed such issues as the adequacy of the disclosure, the patient's capacity for understanding and responsible decision making,2'3 4 and sources of influence on the decision-making process 5. However, recently we were confronted with a patient whose refusal to accept recommended medical treatment raised an issue which has not previously been discussed, namely, should a physician respect a patient ' The patient does not believe she has cancer when the diagnosis is based on more equivocal evidence, such as subtle changes on a diagnostic procedure.
Other factors being equal, it would seem that stronger efforts should be made to alter a false belief where P approaches i (example I) than where P is substantially less than i (example 2). * In addition, for any given value of P, the efforts expended to alter a false belief may be greater when the consequences of holding the belief are more severe.
Consider two other examples: EXAMPLE 3
The patient refuses to believe that she has a malignant breast mass.
EXAMPLE 4
The patient refuses to believe that she has a benign breast mass.
Assuming P to be the same in both cases, it seems obvious that more resources should be directed towards changing the patient's belief in example 3 as compared to example 4.
Other potential grounds for intervention
In the previous discussion, justification for intervention was based exclusively on the liberty principle. * * But the enhancement of freedom need not be the sole justification for intervention since freedom is not the only, nor is it necessarily the highest, *It is, however, important to point out that the obligation in example 2 is not to convince the patient that she has cancer but only to convince the patient that she may have cancer at the probability level accepted by the medical community. In other words, the patient should be disabused of the following belief: 'there is no increased (above random average) chance of my having cancer ' However, it is important to distinguish false belief as grounds for incompetency from the issue of 'irrationality' of the decision. Although the psychiatric consultant in our case based his determination of incompetency in part on the 'unreasonableness' of the patient's decision to refuse surgeryt, it has been strongly argued that competency regarding capacity to give meaningful consent must be distinguished from the seeming 'unreasonableness' of the decision and should instead be based on the patient's understanding of the consequences of the options available to him 9. Thus, any argument relating incompetency and false belief should be based on a lack of understanding rather than the 'reasonableness' of the patient's decision.
A persistently held belief with P = i falseness, not based on ignorance, might be considered grounds for incompetency. But, because in actuality P is always less than I, an argument in favour of incompetency based on a persistent false belief should be entertained very cautiously and only where the probability of falseness is very high. Even then, alternative explanations other than incompetency should be considered, such as religious beliefs or the patient's distrust of the source of the information. 
Conclusion
We have argued that a physician has a moral obligation to attempt to change a patient's false belief, and that this obligation is both justified and limited by the liberty principle. The efforts expended in meeting that obligation are tempered by the probability of falseness of the belief and by the severity of the consequences which follow from holding the belief. Where justified interventions to change belief fail, and when the probability of the falseness of the belief is high, the physician may appropriately raise the question of mental competency. The physician may also consider intervention based on the justification of the harm principle, but it should be recognized that, in using this justification for intervention, the false belief becomes a secondary issue. If the patient does not yield to justifiable interventions to change belief, is competent, and the harm principle cannot be legitimately invoked, we feel that the physician is obliged to respect the patient 's refusal. Epilogue to the case report A complicating factor in our case was the patient's social history. She was a poor white from Appalachia with a third-grade education. The fact that her treating physician was black was a major reason for her not believing that she had cancer. Discussions with another physician (who was white) and with her daughter resulted in a change in belief. Subsequently the patient consented to and successfully underwent a hysterectomy. She has continued to refuse hip surgery, but there are no plans to intervene coercively in this regard.
